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INCONSISTENCIES IN PUBLIC UTILITY DEPRECIATION:
DEDUCTION OF DEPRECIATION FOR RATE
BASE PURPOSES*
Robert D. Haunt

W HEN

considering depreciation for rate base purposes the courts
and the commissions speak of accrued depreciation,91 existing
depreciation,92 actual depreciation,93 complete depreciation,9 ' realized
depreciation,98 incomplete depreciation,96 and observed depreciation. 91
Accrued, existing and actual depreciation all have the same meaning.
In the words of one special master, confirmed orally by a federal court,
this is:
"the di:fference between the value of an article new and its present
value. When applied to the various items of property which
enter into and make up the plant ... it does not mean these items
are to be treated as junk and so valued, nor as second-hand
machinery, and then given market value as such. They must be
valued as items of machinery used and useful to the company in
giving efficient and adequate service to the public. . . . Do they
render as efficient service as new units will? Will they last as
long or are they obsolete or inadequate? •.. Their market value
as second-hand machinery is not to be considered, but their value
for the purposes for which they are being used, as compared
with new units put in their place. This meaning of accrued de- .

* The first part of this article appeared in the December issue, 38 M1cH, L. REV.
160 (1939).-EJ.
.. . .
B.A., State College of Washington; M.A., University of Chicago; J.D., Michigan; C.P.A., Kentucky; Professor of Accounting, University of Kentucky College of
Commerce.-EJ.
·
111 McCarclle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 4~, 57 S. Ct. 144 (1926);
Public Utility Comm. v. Solar Electric Co., (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm. 1938) 24 P. U. R.
(N. S.) 337. .
112 Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 33 S. Ct. 729 (1913); Illinois Bell
Tel. Co., 292 U. S. 151, 54 S. Ct. 658 (1933).
93
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Railroad Commission, (D. C. S. C. 1925)
5 F. (2d) 77.
9
' Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U.S. 1, 29 S. Ct. 148 (1909).
115 Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm., (D. C. Ind. 1924) 300 F.
190 at 198.
98
Ibid.
111
Re Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., (N. C. Util. Comm. 1934) 7 P. U. R.
(N. S.) 21.
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preciation must be kept in mind in arriving at its amount when
applied to the property of this company." 98
Complete or realized depreciation is that w.hich has resulted in full
expiration of service life. Incomplete depreciation has reference to
loss of service value in property not yet retired and is therefore synonymous with accrued depreciation. By observed depreciation is meant that
which can be seen by the eye, to be determined by appraisers who estimate the physical condition of the property as compared with new
equipment after inspection, possible mechanical tests, and, as advocated
by some, with some allowance for inadequacy and obsolescence.99
Theoretical depreciation, which is a term frequently used, refers to a
method of arriving at the depreciation that has taken place and not to
a type of depreciation/00 It is the amount determined by means of a life
table based on a s~dy of the average life of large numbers of like units.
Necessity for Deduction for Rate Base Purposes
In the cases the necessity for, and the amount of, the accrued depreciation deduction for rate base purposes receives far more consideration than does the annual depreciation. As has been stated earlier,
there now remains no question as to the necessity of deducting accrued
depreciation in determining the rate base.101. The utilities have long
since ceased to contest this fundamental issue, but they have never
discontinued their efforts to minimize the amount of the deduction to
be made. Illustrative of the type of reasoning employed by the utilities
is the "plant immortality theory" mentioned above in connection with
the discussion of annual depreciation.1.02 This theory, as expounded by
Professor Henry Earle Riggs in his book Depreciation of Public Utility
Properties, conceives of a utility plant as a permanent entity of which
the parts may change but which as a plant will continue indefinitely.
As to physical depreciation Professor Riggs says:
"The writer is of the opinion that the proper method of fixing
the amount of physical property depreciation is to make a study
of the property under investigation, determine its proper normal
98 Arkansaw Water Co. v. City of Little Rock, (D. C. Ark. 1923) P. U. R. 1924C
73 at 106-107.
.
99 WiscoNSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CoMMISSION, DEPRECIATION 53-54 (1933).
100 Roberts, "Depreciation as an Element in Public Utility Valuation," l Mo. L.
REV. 145 (1936).
1.oi Part I, 38 MicH. L. REV. 160 at 161 (1939), and cases cited in note 7.
See also United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission of Kentucky, (D. C. Ky.
1925) 13 F. (2d) 510.
102 Part I, 38 MICH. L. REV. 160 at 163 (1939).
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condition taking into account the extent and character of the
business, the demands upon the property, the extent and quality
of past maintenance over a period of years, and to estimate carefully the work that ought to be done to bring the entire property,
as one operating entity, up to the normal operating condition or
the maximum condition in which it should be maintained having
due regard for all economic considerations." 105
On the subject of obsolescence he has the following to say:
"No deduction from value on purely conjectural grounds
should be considered. If a property has obsolete equipment or
equipment that is not wholly up to date it seems fair to assume
either that sound business policy will dictate its replacement by a
more economical unit, in which case the question of obsolescence is
one for future operating expenses, or that the economies to be
e:ffected are not enough to justify the supersession. If this latter
be the case the presumption is that the unit will continue to serve
until worn out in service and replaced in the ordinary course of
maintenance." 10'
This is what Professor Goddard classifies as a deferred maintenance
theory,10 G under which, as he says, there is small .occasion for a reserve
and, in fixing the rate base, no need for a deduction for depreciation,
at most a deduction only for deferred maintenance. The latter is the
amount required to put the plant in condition to provide one hundred
per cent service-Professor Riggs' physical depreciation.105
Rices, DEPRECIATION OF PUBLIC UnLITY PROPERTIES 128 (1922).
Ibid., pp. 138-139.
105 This theory was first presented by Allison, "Should Public Service Properties
be Depreciated to Obtain Fair Value in Rate or Regulation Cases?" REPORT OF &r.
Louis PUBLIC SERVICE CoMMISSION ON THE UNITED RAlwAYS CoMPANY OF ST. Loms,
Appendix A, pp. 73-121 (1912).
Pros and cons of the theory are presented in a series of articles in the Quarterly
Journal of Economics: Young, "Depreciation and Rate Control," 28 Q. J. EcoN.
630 (1914); Davis, "Depreciation and Rate Control: A Criticism," 29 Q. J. EcoN.
362 (1915); Bauer, "Depreciation and Rate Control: A Question of Justice," 29
Q. J. EcoN. 651 (1915); Bonbright, "Depreciation and Rate Control: A Further
Discussion," 30 Q. J. EcoN. 546 (1916). Riggs reaffirms his belief in the theory in
"Facts and Fallacies about 'Straight-line' Depreciation," I 2 PUB. UnL. FoRTN. 393
(1933); CARTER and RANSOM, DEPRECIATION CHARGES OF RAILROADS AND PUBLIC
UnLIT:JES (1921) (A Memorandum filed with the Depreciation Section of the Bureau
of Accounts of the Interstate Commerce Commission) present this same view.
106 Goddard, "The Interest of Public Utility Ratepayers in Depreciation," 48
HARV. L. REv. 721 at 730 (1935).
103
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Methods of Determining Accrued Depreciation
Obviously a theory of depreciation such as that outlined by Professor Riggs is dependent upon an observation method of determining
accrue_d depreciation. Estimated service life of the property, or its
age at the time of the determination of the depreciation, have no place
in such a theory of depreciation. The present fair value doctrine for the
determination of the rate base plays directly into the hand of the
utilities in this respect.107 The Supreme Court did not in Smythe v.
Ames 108 attempt to give any definitive meaning to its concept of "fair
value" 100 and _particularly did it fail to indicate the functional relation
between the facts it laid down as evidentiary of fair value and the
respective rights of utility investors and consumers which the test of
fair value is to recognize and protect. While subsequent cases have by
a piecemeal process evolved a substantive law rule of fair value new as
composed of some sort of mixture of the elements derived from original
cost and present cost of reproduction, they offer little help in. determining what principles of depreciation the Court derives from its fair
value concept. The Court seemingly "gropes in the dark" for a satisfactory theory concerning the deduction for accrued depreciation. The
utility engineer meets this sense of vacuum on the part of the courts
with the too obvious explap.ation that value new_ need only be reduced
by the amount necessary to put the property in condition to operate
as efficiently as new. Surprisi~gly, some courts accept this as a solution
of the problem.110
The utilities naturally desire to hold the valuation of their properties for rate base purposes at the highest possible figure, since this is
the figure on which they are entitled to recci:ve a fair rate of return.
107 See comment in NEw YoRK COMMISSION oN REVISION OF PuBLIC SERVICE
CoMMISSIONs LAw, MINORITY REPORT 358 (1930) (N. Y. Leg. Doc. 75). The
minority commissioners (Frank P. Walsh, James C. Bonbright and David C. Adie) say
the courts are logically compelled, under the fair value theory, to make. a distinction
between depreciation -provided against and the depreciation the properties have actually
mstained at the time when the valuation is being made.
108 169 U.S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 418 (1898).
109 Kauper, "Wanted: A New Definition of the Rate Base," 37 MICH. L. REv.
IZ09 (1939).
110 New York & Queens Gas Co. v. Prendergast, (D. C. N. Y. 1924) l F. (2d)
351; Kings County Lighting Co. v. Prendergast, (D. C. N. Y. 1925) 7 F. (id)
192; Consolidated Gas Co. v. Newton, (D. C. N. Y•. 1920) 267 F. 231; Brooklyn
Union Gas Co. v. Prendergast, (D. C. N. Y. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 628; New York &
Queens Gas Co. v. Newton, (D. C: N. Y. 1920) 269 F. 277; Bronx Gas & Elec. Co.
v. Public Service Comm., (N. Y. S. Ct. 1922) P. U. R. 1923A 255. See also the cases
cited in 2 WHITrEN, VALUATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE CoRPORATIONS, 2d ed., by
Wilcox,§ 828 (1928).
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This was the cause of their contention for reproduction value during the
period of rising prices which existed during the early years of regulation and up to very recent times. The same reason exists for their
insistence upon the observation method of determining existing depreciation.
The United States Supreme Court has not approved the use of
deferred maintenance as a measure of accrued depreciation.111 It is
said, however, that it has accepted observed depreciation in preference
to age-life calculations.112 This conclusion is based on statements in the
San Francisco 118 and Indianapolis Water Co. m cases. In the former case
the United States Supreme Court, in referring to objections to use of
the "modified sinking-fund method" followed by the master of a
federal court in calculating accrued depreciation, said:
"Appellant objects to the application of this method and
insists that depreciation should have been ascertained upon full
consideration of the definite testimony given by competent experts who examined the structural units, spoke concerning the
observed depreciation and made estimates therefrom. As these
examinations were made subsequent to the alleged depreciation
for the definite purpose of ascertaining existing facts, we think the
criticism is not without merit. Facts shown by reliable evidence
were preferable to averages based upon assumed probabilities.
When a plant has been conducted with unusual skill the owner
may justly claim the consequent benefits." m
Later, in the Indianapolis Water Co. case, the Court said:
"The testimony of competent valuation engineers who examined
the property and made estimates in respect to its condition is to be
111

2 BoNBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY II29 (1937); W1scONSIN
PUBLIC SERVICE CoMMISSION, DEPRECIATION 97-98 (1933). There is no exact correlation between the deferred maintenance measure of accrued depreciation and the
amount determined by the observation method. According to most writers, the latter·
would include a somewhat broader category of factors and result in a larger amount
of accrued depreciation. In fact, there is nowhere to be found a clear-cut explanation,
on which all appraisers would agree, of how depreciation is to be determined by observation.
112
MASON, PRINCIPLES OF PuBL1c-UT1LITY DEPRECIATION 109 (1937). The
New York commission says in Re Bronx Gas & Elec. Co., (N. Y. Dept. Pub. Serv.,
State Div., 1937) 24 P. U. R. (N. S.) 65, that the Court has never made observed
depreciation compulsory.
m Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Francisco, 265 U.S. 403, 44 S. Ct. 537 (1924).
m McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400, 47 S. Ct. 144 (1926).
115
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Francisco, 265 U.S. 403 at 406, 44 S. Ct. 537
(1924).
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preferred to mere calculations based on averages and assumed
probabilities." 116
In regard to these decisions, the authors of Depreciation, published by
the Wisconsin Public Service Con:unission, have the following to say:
"It appears to us that the decisions of the Court, as quoted
above, apparently go no further than establishing the doctrine
that actual estimates based on inspection are preferable to arbitrary measures such as assuming that property diminishes in value
in the same proportion that its age bears to average service life
of comparable properties without giving direct consideration to
the quality of maintenance or the special circumstances affecting
the property in question." 117
If this interpretation is correct, the age-life methods would be acceptable if based on due consideration of the maintenance policy of the
particular company and if periodic checks were made of the estimated
service lives used in the calculations of depreciation of the property.
The problem of depreciation resolves itself into a valuation of expired service life without regard to _second-hand or liquidation values.118
Obviously "value" and "valuation," as used in regulation of rates of
public utilities, have peculiar meanings. Value cannot here have the
meaning the economist attaches to the term ( capitalized future benefits or earnings) because it is the future earnings themselves which are
to be determined and which will be based upon the valuation placed
upon the property.119 The United States Supreme Court has said the
"value" .sought in public utility regulation is "present fair value," but
it has not worked out this valuation on an economic basis. As a .result
the term value, as used here, is somewhat misleading to one thinking
in terms of the economist's nomenclature.
Disregarding for the time being the very serious objections to the
implications of the fair value doctrine and its difficulties in application
as it has been worked out,120 the question may well be asked whether, in
view of the well-known absurd differences which usually exist between
the estimates of observed depreciation made by different parties in
116

McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400 at 416, 47 S. Ct. 744

(1926).
WiscoNSIN PuBLic SERVICE CoMMISSioN, DEPRECIATION 97 (1932).
Part I, 38 MicH. L. REV. 160 at 182 (1939).
119 See 2 BoNBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY 658-691 (1937).
120 See Kauper, "Wanted: A New Definition of the Rate Base," 37 M1cH. L.
REv. 1209 (1939), for a summary of the objections to the "fair value" doctrine. All
that is said there applies equally to the treatment of depreciation, which is merely one
phase of public utility valuation.
117

118
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attempting to determine fair value in a given case,121 we should not
be. pretty well convinced that there is a fundamental weakness in such
a system of determining depreciation.
It is unquestionably true that some lower federal courts and some
state courts have interpreted the United States Supreme Court's views
as requiring the determination of accrued depreciation by the observation method.122 Bonbright says the most serious defect of the observation method is that it encourages commissions and lower courts to make
deductions only for such depreciation as is visible to the inspecting
engineer,128 and cites New York & Queens Gas Co. v. Prendergastm
as an example. Certainly in view of the lack of agreement between
engineers and appraisers on their methods of observation and in the
amounts of observed depreciation which different appraisers find in a
given property, there is a serious temptation to the lower court to take
the accrued depreciation figure which is least likely to cause its decision to be overruled, regardless of what figure is most probably correct in a given case.
It would seem that the language of the Supreme Court in the San
Francisco and Indianapolis Water Co. cases is open to a construction
which permits use of the age-life·method of determining accrued depreciation. In the United Railways case 125 Justice Brandeis stated the
question was still open. It is believed that the Court would approve such
a method in a case properly presented in which the accrued depreciation
was determined on an age-life basis, using the experience of the particular utility involved, if such determination is shown to have been
121 In Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm., 187
La. 137, 174 So. 180 (1937), one estimate of obacrved depreciation was 22 per cent of
reproduction cost new and another about I I per cent. Re Long Island Lighting Co.,
(N. Y. Dept. Pub. Serv., State Div., 1936) 18 P.U.R. (N. S.) 65, presents a good case
Ehowing the· absurdities of this method of accruing depreciation, as does Re Peoples
Gas Light & Coke Co., (Ill. Commerce Comm. 1937) 19 P. U. R. (N. S.) 177.
In the latter case observed depreciation on parts of the properties as found by one engineer was 14.57 per cent and by another 30.41 per cent. Still other properties were
observed to be depreciated 20.8 I per cent by one and 42.99 per cent by the other.
Certainly these are delusive indications of accuracy in measurement.
122 Several such cases are cited by Guernsey, "Some Depreciation Questions," 4
TEMPLE L. Q. 203 at 213-215 (1930). Additional cases are cited by W1scoNSIN
PtmLIC SER.VICE CoMMISSION, DEPRECIATION 100-101 (1933).
128 2 BoNBR.IGHT, THE VALUATION OF PR.oPER.TY n33 (1937). Other limitations
are: (1) it ignores deterioration not perceptible to the eye of the appraiser, (2) observation itself gives no basis for an inference as to how long an asset which is still giving
good service will continue to do so. I ibid., 205.
124 {D. C. N. Y. 1924) 1 F. (2d) 351.
125 United Railways & Elec. Co. of Baltimore v. West, 280 U. S. 234, 50 S. Ct.
123 (1930).
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subjected to periodic checks.126 This would avoid the "mere calculations
based on averages and assumed probabilities" to which· objection is
voiced in the two cases quoted from. If, as stated in the Minnesota
Rate Cases 121 "the extent of the existing depreciation should be shown
and deducted," and if the Court was right in its definition of depreciation in the Lindheimer case,128 it would seem it could not deny the use
of an age-life method of determining accrued depreciation. In fact it
clearly approved that method in affirming the decree of the district
court in the Des Moines case. The district court had confirmed the
report of the special master in chancery in which, in regard to valuation
of property, the master had said:
"It is not a question of what was actually expended therefor in
the plant in question, but what it would cost to reproduce a similar
plant at the present time. It is through this method we reach the
present value of this plant new, and then when it is properly depreciated, according to the condition, life and age of its various
parts, we reach the present value of the plant in its present condition." 129
The only factor mentioned by the master here which the age-life
methods could possibly fail to take into account is the condition of the
property, and that would be covered by periodic checks upon the
estimated life of the property.
·we have seen that the question of accrued depreciation does not
arise under the earlier view of the sinking-fund method of accounting
for depreciation; so, while this method is based on age-life calculations,
its approval by the Court is no authority for the use of age-life methods
of determining accrued depreciation. This is not true of the straightline method, which is also based on age-life calculations, Nevertheless,
we find the United States Supreme Court dealing with rate cases in
which straight-line methods were used and expressing no disagreement
with this method. In the Southwestern Bell" Telephone Co. case_180
the_ decisi<:>n of the Missouri Supreme C<?urt sustaining the commission's
order was reversed, but no mention is made of .any fault in the com126 This, •with the exception of the periodic check-up, is the suggestion of Alvin
C. Reis, Chief-Counsel of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission. 1934 P'&oc. NAT.
AssN. R.:R. & UnL. 215-at 225-226.
u 7 230 U.S. 35-2 at 457, 33 S. Ct. 729 (1913).
128 Lindheimer v. Ulinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151, 54 S. Ct. 658 (1933).
129 Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, 238 U. S. 153 ·at 168', 35 S. Ct.
Su (1915).
180 Missouri. ex .rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm.,
262 U. S. 276, 43 S. Ct. 544 (1923).
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mission's use of the straight-line method of determining depreciation.
In the Lindheimer case 131 the Court held no confiscation was shown and
criticized the company for its inconsistency in its claims with respect
to existing depreciation as compared with the amounts it had taken
for annual depreciation on the straight-line basis, and by implication,
as compared with the reserve thus accumulated.
Whatever may be the view of the federal courts on the method
of determining accrued depreciation, there is clear-cut recognition of
age-life methods by the commissions 182 and by some state courts. The
New York commission says:
"Depreciation measures the consumption of property in the
rendition of service, i.e., the consumption of capacity to render
useful service, not only when such consumption is completed but
as it takes place. The consumption of service value is distributed
over its entire life, and the value of property at any one time is
best measured by the relation of the remaining service life to its
total service life." 188
The Wisconsin commission voices the same view when it says:
"We are of the opinion that the most satisfactory method of
determining the necessary accrual [ of depreciation] is on an agelife basis." m
Approval of the straight-line method of determining depreciation by
the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, Third Division, has already been noted.185 The Virginia Supreme Court expresses
definite disapproval of the observation method of ascertaining accrued
depreciation, and says:
Lin4heimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U. S. 151, 54 S. Ct. 658 (1933),
Re Bronx Gas & Elec. Co., (N. Y. Dept. Pub. Serv., State Div., 1937) 24
P. U. R. (N. S.) 65; Re Wisconsin Power & Light Co., (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm.
1938) 24 P. U. R. '(N. S.) 136; Department of Public Works v. Oregon-Washing~on
Water Service Co., (Wash. Dept. Pub. Works, 1934) 8 P. U. R. (N. S.) 293; Re
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., (Okla. Corp. Comm. 1935) 9 P. U. R. (N. S.) 113;
Re Chesapeake -& Potomac Tel. Co., (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm., 1933) I P. U. R.
(N. S.) 346; Re Home Gas & Elec. Co., (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm. 1934) 5 P. U. R.
(N. S.) 107; East Ohio Gas Co. v. City of Cleveland, (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm. 1939)
27 P. U. R. (N. S.) 387; Illinois Commerce Comm. v. Public Service Co. of
Northern Illinois, (Ill. Comm. Comm. 1934) 4 P. U. R. (N. S.) 1; City of Blytheville v. Blytheville Water Co., (Ark. Dept. Pub. Util. 1936) 15 P. U. R. (N. S.) 177.
13 , Re Bronx Gas & Elec. Co., (N. Y. Dept. Pub. Serv., State Div., 1937) 24
.
P. U. R. (N. S,),65 at 94.
1 u Re Wisconsin Power & Light Co., (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1938) 24 P. U. R.
(N. S.) 136 at 149.
135 Part I, 38 M1cH, L. REv. 160 at 181, note 73 (1939).
181

182
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"Observable physical deterioration is always an important factor
in determining accrued depreciation; but due weight should also
be given to every other existing factor which has the e:ffect of
reducing the present fair value of the property below its reproduction new cost. • •• There may be and often is present in units
of a property ••. physical deterioration which is not observable
but from common experience is known to exist. In many instances
one of the best indications of such deterioration is the ratio of
past service life to the total reasonably to be expected service life
of the unit." 136

If it is contended that service life cannot be predicted with reasonable certainty for the practical purposes of regulation of rates, it may
be noted that "the unpredictability of the survival of an individual
human life is no less obvious and yet that fact has been no practical
obstacle to the development of an extensive life insurance business
based upon studies of life expectancy and tables developed therefrom.
Similar studies of property lives have been made and mathematical
predictions of life expectancy for various classes of property developed.137 Experience is of course not available for all classes of property
which may be in use by a given utility. It is doubtful, however, whether
errors in estimation of service life, when based upon knowledge of
conditions of the particular company and when verified by current check
on the property in use, will be as likely as under the observation
method, which as previously indicated, results in widely disparate
estimates.
Consistency Between Annual and Accrued Depreciatipn
In the process of estimating service life of depreciable property,
errors will inevitably occur. If the error is in underestimation of the
life, and at some time prior to abandonment of the property the error
is discovered and the depreciation reserve is thus shown to be in excess
of the accrued depreciation, a question naturally arises as to how
this may a:ffect future annual depreciation allowances. Of course, if
no need for consistency between the annual and the accrued depreciation is recognized, and the accrued depreciation is to be determined by
the observation method, no new difficulty arises in these situations, since
188

Alexandria Water Co. v. Alexandria, 163 Va. 5iz at 563, 177 S. E. 454

(1934).
187 See I BoNBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPER.TY 178, note 2 (1937), for
citation of authorites. See also Report of Special Committee on Depreciation, "Depreciation Principles and Methods," 1938 PR.oc. NAT. AssN. R. R. AND UnL. CoMMRS.
4-38 at 502 et seq., for discussion of the actuarial method of estimating service life.
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the reserve is no indication of the accrued depreciation. In any case,
the United States Supreme Court has definitely resolved the issue
where the reserve exceeds what is found to be the accrued depreciation
(by whatever m_ethod the accrued depreciation is determined). The
Court held 138 that the New Jersey commission could not use the excess
reserve accumulated from past annual depreciation allowances to overcome deficits in present or future earnings or to sustain rates which
would otherwise be confiscatory. The Court said:
"Constitutional protection against confiscation does not depend on
the source of the money used to purchase the property•••• The
revenue paid by the customers for service belongs to the company.
The amount, if any, remaining after paying taxes and operating
expenses, including the expense of depreciation, is the company's
compensation for the use of its property. If there is no return, or
if the amount is less than a reasonable return, the company must
bear the loss. Past losses cannot be used to enhance the value of
the property or to support a claim that rates for the future are
confiscatory. • . • And the law does not require the company to
give up for the benefit of future subscribers any part of its accumulations from past operations. Profits of the past cannot be used to
sustain confiscatory rates for the future." 189
The New York commission seems to have applied an opposite view
to that of the United States Supreme Court in a case involving the
same New Yark Telephone Company when it says:
"it is inequitable to require the subscribers to pay over the entire
life of the property more than the actual loss sustained when
the property is retired. This being so, the proper basis upon which
to fix an annual rate of depreciation is to make it such that over
the remaining life of the property a sufficient additional amount
1311 Board of Public Utility Commrs. v. New York Tel. Co., 271 U. S. 23, 46
S. Ct. 363 (1926).
139 Ibid., 271 U.S. 23 at 31-32. Accord: State ex rel. Empire District Elec. Co.
v. Public Service Comm., 339 Mo. II88, 100 S. W. (2d) 509 (1936); Re Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., (Neb. St. Ry. Comm. 1935) II P. U. R. (N. S.) 337; Re
Big Horn Oil & Gas Development Co., (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1938) 27 P. U. R.
(N. S.) 41; Re Home Gas & Elec. Co., (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm. 1934) 5 P. U. R.
(N. S.) 107. In Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm., (Wis. 1939)
287 N. W. 167, the court, while recognizing that the public has no redress for contributions to capital arising from excessive depreciation charges, docs go half way
in seeking consistency when it says that excessive reserve indicates past annual depreciation has been calculated on too high a rate and upholds a reduced rate used by the
commission.

49°
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will be accumulated so that the reserve at the time of retirement
will equal the loss sustained at that time." 140
Here past rates for annual depreciation had been too high in light of
the evidence presented at the time of the hearing. The cause of the
resulting excessive reserve was the slowing down of growth with the
depression years, which resulted in a decrease in the amount of anticipated replacements as compared with earlier years. The implication
from the case is that the annual rate of depreciation adopted by the
commission was lower than would have been proper had there not been
more in the reserve than present anticipations of retirements would
require.141
The view of the New York commission is more in accord with
the writer's contention for consistent treatment of annual and accrued
depreciation, as expressed above, than is the position taken by the
Supreme Court. Under the "fair value" theory, the Court has no
alternative to its view; and in accordance with this theory the New
York commission should be overruled by the Court, unless it could be
argued that the utility is estopped because it took the annual depreciation allowance with notice of the commission's regulations requiring
deduction for accrued depreciation purposes of whatever amounts were
taken as annual depreciation. It would seem that the amount of depreciation to ·be deducted for rate base purposes should ·be considered
as a matter of ''fairness," and that nothing "fairer" to all parties concerned could be devised than to require deduction for rate base purposes of the same amount as was used for annual depreciation. It must
be remembered that we are dealing with a peculiar meaning of ''value"
in public utility rate regulation, and this would seem to fit into such a
meaning as is appropriate for the purpose.
·
Of course there may be an overestimation of service life as well as
an underestimation. Here again the United States Supreme Court has
passed upon the matter, though not in as conclusive fashion as in the
case of underestimation of service life. In Pacific Gas & Electric Ca.
v. San Francisco 1 ' 2 the company had acquired rights to the use of certain inventions which would involve abandonment of equipment and
140 Re New York Telephone Co., (N. Y. Dept. Pub. Serv., State Div., 1936)
14 P. U. R. (N. S.) 443 at 450.
iu See Berkson, "Excess Depreciation Reserve and Rate Control," 36 Cot. L.
REV. 250 (1936), for discussion of cases where the reserve exceeds "actual" depreciation.
142 265 U.S. 403, 44 S. Ct. 537 (1924).
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substitution of other much more economical equipment, worked out in
the company's plant by salaried engineers and proved by use on reconstructed gas generators. The company contended the inventions were
to be included in the rate base at the capitalized value of the savings
their use would occasion. The commission allowed only their cost, and
refused to permit amortization of the remaining value of the abandoned
equipment over future periods out of the savings from the use of the
patents. The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
district court, which had sustained the commission's order. In so doing,
the Court mentioned two possible means available to save the c;ompany
from actual ultimate loss from its action in adopting the inventions:
(I) fix the rate base by adding some fair value for the patent rights
to the inventory, or ( 2) allow prompt recoupment of the obsolescence
caused by the introduction of the patents. It did not prescribe which
method should be followed by the lower court, to which the case was
remanded. The case is therefore not clear authority for carrying forward obsolescence which could not reasonably have been foreseen and
provided for. A consistent treatment of annual and accrued depreciation
would seem to justify carrying forward the unrecovered cost as provided for in the second suggestion made by the Supreme Court. Otherwise the utility suffers loss from the very action which it took in order
to give the more economical and efficient service. Obvious danger lurks
within extension of this privilege unless adequate supervision of abandonments is exercised.
The Arkansas commission has the following to say about abandonments resulting from obsolescence or inadequacy:
"The installation of a new machine, whether caused by obsolescence or inadequacy of the old, usually means lower operating costs
or greater revenues, which in turn means lower rates or better
service. Those who get the benefit of these lower rates or better
service should pay for the improvements that made them possible.
This can be accomplished only through the plan indicated [ an
abandoned property account to be amortized over future periods].
Changes and removals at the instance of public authorities do not
ordinarily improve the service, increase the revenues, or lower
operating costs. They are usually made because of a civic improvement, such as removing poles and wires from streets to alleys
or underground, or for the purpose of widening or paving streets
or highways. Theoretically, at least, these changes make the community in which they take place a better place in which to live
or result in greater convenience to the public. The cost of such
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changes should be borne by those who will enjoy and receive the
benefits thereof." m
This perhaps supplies an explanation why it may not be an undue
burden on the consumers of the future periods to carry forward the
loss caused by sudden obsolescence.144 It does not alter the fact that the
loss was a loss chargeable to the service rendered by the retired property, since it is that property which is lost. The new property has cost
no more simply because the old had a limited life not accurately predictable in advance.
One further question remains in connection with the "duty" to
provide for annual depreciation as laid down in the Knoxville case.145
Suppose the utility has incurred losses in the past or has not earned
sufficient income to cover depreciation. Does this justify the company
in charging more depreciation in the future than would otherwise be
permissible? In those states that follow the prudent investment theory
of valuation, it is recognized that unearned depreciation need not be
deducted for rate base purposes so long as there has been no mismanagement and no improper payment of dividends.146 This does not mean
that future annual depreciation charges may be increased. The United
States Supreme Court has held that such losses cannot be made the
basis for increased depreciation charges. In the Galveston case the
Court said:
·
·
"The fact that a utility may reach financial success only in time
or not at all, is a reason for allowing a liberal return on the money
invested in the enterprise; but it does not make past losses an element to be considered in deciding what the base value is and
whether the rate is confiscatory. A company which has failed to
secure from year to year sufficient earnings to keep the investment
m City of Blytheville v. Blytheville Water Co., {Ark. Dept. Pub. Util. 1936)
IS P. U. R. (N. S.) 177 at 199.
144 For further approval of the carry-over of sudden and unexpected obsolescence,
see Re Michigan Bell Tel. Co., (Mich. Pub. Util. Comm. 1935) 10 P. U. R. (N. S.)
149.
.
HG Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. I, 29 S. Ct. 148 (1909), dis-cussed in Part I, 38 M1cH. L. REV. 160 at 167 (1939).
us Re Blue Hill St. Ry., (Mass. Pub. Serv. Comm.) P. U. R. 1915E 370;
Bay State Rate Case, (Mass. Pub. Serv. Comm.) P. U. R. 1916F 221. In the latter
case the commission required restoration of depreciation losses to be taken care of before
paying dividends, however.
In an Idaho case the commission permitted an undepreciated rate base, where
the company had never earned a return on the investment, even though the prudent
investment theory is not followed in Idaho. Re Pocatello Gas & Power Co., (Idaho
Pub. Util. Comm. 1922) P. U. R. 1923C 25.
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unimpaired and to pay a fair return, whether its failure was the
result of imprudence in engaging in the enterprise, or of errors
in management, or of omission to exact proper prices for its output,
cannot erect out of past deficits a legal basis for holding confiscatory for the future, rates which would, on the basis of present
reproduction value, otherwise be compensatory. . .. Past losses
obviously do not tend to prove present values." m .
The above case involved development losses. In the Georgia Railways case us it was held that the insufficiency of previous rates as a
reason for failure to take depreciation presented an even clearer case
for refusal to allow increased future depreciation allowance. 149
Strict adherence to the consistent theory of depreciation suggested
by the writer 150 would require a utility to deduct depreciation for rate
base purposes even where the depreciation applied to prior years in
which earnings were insufficient to cover such a charge. It would also
deny the right to charge added amounts of depreciation in future
periods to offset failure to earn depreciation in earlier years. It does
not follow, however, that the commission, in the exercise of its discretion, could not permit the utility as a matter of privilege rather
than right to deduct only such depreciation as has been earned, and to
carry forward the remainder for inclusion in the future annual allowances. It would seem that the view taken by the Supreme Court on this
matter is not contrary to a consistent treatment of depreciation. The
proper solution to this problem is to allow the utilities a reasonable rate
in the first place in order that they may assume the risk of not earning
their depreciation. In case this is done, it would not be necessary to
permit carrying forward any loss which might result from providing
for depreciation.
Consistency between the annual depreciation and the accrued depreciation is impossible under the observation method of determining
accrued depreciation. Observed depreciation is determined only at the
time when rates are set or approved by the commission. This must
inevitably occur only at intervals, more or less extended. The annual
dep~·eciation ·charges, on the other hand, must be determined from
period to period between such dates of determination of accrued deuT Galveston Electric Co. v. City of Galveston, 258 U. S. 388 at 395, 42 S. Ct.
351 (1922).
148 Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission of Georgia, 262 U. S.
625, 43 S. Ct. 680 (1923).
140 Accord, on failure to charge depreciation in early years: State ex rel. Laclede
Gas Light Co. v. Public Service Comm., 341 Mo. 920, IIO S. W. {2d) 749 (1937).
150 Part I, 38 M1cH. L. REv. 160 at 184 (1939).
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preciation. Obviously the utility commissions cannot themselves conduct investigations each period to determine the increase in observed
depreciation during that period, nor can they prescribe any form of
regulation whereby the utility may be required to do this in the same
way in which· the commission would have done it. In any case, an
observation of depreciation as of any given date would not be concerned with depreciation which had been presumed to have oq:urred in
prior periods and which was therefore taken up in operating expense.
By the application of an age-life method both to the determination of
annual depreciation and to the calculation of accrued .depreciation, a
logical consistency is maintained and fair treatment is accorded both
the utility investors and the consumers.
The need for consistency between annual depreciation and accrued
depreciation is recognized by the commissions 1111 and by some courts. 1112
The problem usually arises in connection with a claim by the utility
that its property is in a certain per cent condition, such as ninety per
cent, though it has accumulated a depreciation reserve through annual
depreciation charged to operating expenses of possibly as much as
twenty-five per cent to forty or fifty per cent of the depreciable value
of the property. On the whole the decisions of the courts are unsatisfactory on this issue. Most of them hold that no relationship, need· exist
between the depreciation reserve built up through the annual depreciation charges and the accrued depreciation which is deducted "for rate
base purposes.1113 Thus they permit the utility to adopt the inconsistent
1111 Re Long Island Lighting Co., (N. Y. Dept. Pub. Serv., State Div., 1936)
18 P. U. R. (N. S.) 65; Mayor of Monroe v. Georgia Continental Tel. Co., (Ga.
Pub. Serv. Comll).. 1938) 25 P. U. R. (N. S.) 95; Certain Persons of Elmira v.
Elmira Light, Heat & Power Corp., (N. Y. Dept. Pub. Serv., State Div., 1937) 22
P. U. R: (N. S.) 99; Re Oregon-Washington Tel. Co., (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm.
1937) 17 P. U. R. (N. S.) 133; Lone Star Gas Co. v. Fort Worth, (Tex. R. R.
Comm. 1937) 20 P. U. R. (N. S.) 89; Illinois Commerce Comm. v. Public Service
Co. of Northern Illinois, (Ill. Comm. Comm. 1934) 4 P. U. R. (N. S.) 1; City of
Blytheville v. Blytheville Water Co., (Ark. Dept. Pub. Util. 1936) 15 P. U. R. (N. S.)
177; Department of Public Works v. Oregon-Washington Tel. Co., (Wash. Dept.
Pub. Works, 1934) 8 P .. U. R. (N. S.) 293; Re Wisconsin Telephone Co;, (Wis.
Pub. Serv. Comm. 1934) 6 P. U. R. (N. S.) 389; Re Reedsburg Tel. Co., (Wis.
Pub. Serv. Comm. 1934) 7 P. U. R. (N. S.) 389.
152 Carey v. Corporation Comm., 168 Okla. 487, 33 P. (2d) 788 (1934);
New York Tel. Co., v. Prendergast, (D. C. N. Y. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 54; Chesapeake
& Potomac Tel. Co. v. Whitman, (D. C. Md. 1925) 3 F. (2d) 938, P. U. R.
1925D 407.
153 State ex rel. Laclede Gas Light Co. v. Public Service Comm., 341 Mo. 920,
no S. W. (2d) 749 (1937); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Whitcomb, (D. C. Wash.
1926) 12 F. (2d) 279; Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Texarkana, (D. C. Ark. 1936)
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policy of "blowing hot by its insistence on having a practically undepreciated rate base and blowing cold at the same time in wanting to charge
a rate high enough to absorb this enormous annual depreciation expense." 1H
However, an awareness of the relation between annual and accrued
depreciation is evident in some opinions. The federal district court in
New York Telephone Co. 'lJ. Prendergast 155 definitely held that the
book reserve was the best evidence of accrued depreciation. Moreover,
the United States Supreme Court in the Lindheimer case took the view
that there is such a logical relationship between accrued and annual
depreciation that if the company makes a claim for inconsistent amounts
it must assume the burden of proving its contentions. It is true that the
book figure for the reserve was not accepted as the accrued depreciation
in the Lindheimer case. However, the amount taken for accrued depreciation seemed to govern the Court's conclusion as to the annual
depreciation, and to indicate the Court's recognition of the need for
consistency.us
The commissions seem to have a clearer understanding of the
problem. Thus the Illinois commission calculated accrued depreciation on the basis of the amount set aside by the company for annual
depreciation on a straight-line basis instead of accepting observed depreciation as found by the company's engineers.151 This resulted in
.I 8.98 per cent accrued depreciation instead of the 8.45 per cent claimed
by the company as observed depreciation. The commission said:
''While we recognize the fact that observed depreciation has
been accorded greater weight as a rule by the courts than .computations of straight-line depreciation based upon the age of the property, still we think it is obvious that a reasonably logical relation
must exist between the annual amount charged as an operating
expense ( taken in conjunction with the age of the property) and
the amount of accrued depreciation found at any particular
time."us
17 F. Supp. 447; Cheltenham & Abington Sewerage Co. v. Public Service Comm.,
122 Pa. Super. 252, 186 A. 149 (1936).
151 Lone Star Gas Co. v. Fort Worth, (Texas R. R. Comm. 1937) 20 P. U. R.
(N. S.) 89 at 125-126.
155 (D. C. N. Y. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 54.
us The Wisconsin Supreme Court seems to take a similar view in two companion
cases, Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm., (Wis. 1939) 287 N. W.
122 and 287 N. W. 167.
157 Illinois Commerce Comm. v. Public Sen•ice Co. of Northern Illinois, (Ill.
Comm. Comm. 1934) 4 P. U. R. (N. S.) 1.
158 Ibid., at 33. In the end the commission used an amount of accrued deprecia-
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Again, in Department of Public Works v. Oregon-Washington
Water Service Company 159 the company made the usual claims of a
high per cent condition of the property and at the same time claimed
such annual rates for depreciation as would clearly have r~ulted in
reserves inconsistent with its claims as to the per cent condition. The
Washington commission instead adopted a per cent condition which
approximated the reserve accumulation. In another case 160 the Wisconsin commission took as accrued depreciation the amount of the reserve
as of a given date prior to the investigation period, at a time when
the company was operating under rates previously determined, plus
net additions calculated on an assumption of annual accruals at an
accepted rate during the period involved in the investigation.161 Taking
the same view, the Georgia commission has said:

"If the same basis is used in determining depreciation accruals
as is used for establishing the accrued depreciation a great deal of
the controversy over the proper rate is removed. If the rate of
accrual is claimed to be too high there will be a higher operating
expense leaving a lower net revenue, but at the same time the
accrued depreciation of the fixed capital should likewise be higher
than if the accruing depreciation were not so large. If on the other
hand the annual accrual is not so large, a higher net revenue will
be left after depreciation charges but the accrued depreciation
should be smaller. The effect of this will yield approximately the
same return on the depreciated value of the property even with
some variatio~ in the depreciation rate so long as it is reasonably
close to the correct amount." 162
Here the company had estimated annual depreciation on certain property at 5.41 per cent on a composite basis. Over·five years this totalled
$12,435 in excess of retirements charge~ to the reserve. The commission rejected the company's claim that observed depreciation had increased only $2,614 during this same period.
The view expressed by the Georgia commission presents an added
argument for consistency between annual and accrued depreciation. If
tion determined by the engineers as the basis for a temporary order made without
prejudice.
·
159 (Wash.·Dept. Pub. Works, 1934) 8 P. U. R. (N. S.) 293.
160 Re Wisconsin Telephone Co., (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1934) 6 P. U. R.
(N. S.) 389.
161 This same procedure was followed. by the Ohio commission in East Ohio Gas
Co. v. City of Cleveland, (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm. 1939) 27 P. U. R. (N. S.) 387.
182 Mayor of City of Monroe v. Georgia Continental Tel. Co., (Ga. Pub. Serv.
Comm. 1938) 25 P. U. R. (N. S.) 95 at 99.
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the rate of annual depreciation selected is reasonably correct and a
consistent accrued depreciation is deducted for rate base purposes, any
slight errors in the rate will have no ill effects on either util1 ty investors or consumers. The same cannot be said of errors in calculating either the annual or the accrued depreciation when inconsistent
methods, such as the observation method, are followed.
In many cases the commissions' approach to the problem of attaining consistency in the treatment of annual and accrued depreciation is
from the opposite angle. The past is treated as a closed book during
which a certain existing depreciation accumulated. This existing depreciation may be taken as indicated by the reserve carried on the books
of the company and future allowances made to accord therewith. Thus
in a New York case iei the balance in the retirement reserve account
was said to be too high to be consistent with the "accruals for retirement expense" claimed by the company as annual depreciation. The
average age of the property was from eight to nine years and the
amount in the reserve was $76r,257. The commission reduced the
annual allowance from the $ I 55,ooo claimed by the company to
$ rno,ooo, an amount which it said would be consistent with the reserve
and the age of the property.16~ In this case there was no indication that
an excess of reser,ve was being used to justify an annual allowance
otherwise insufficient. In another case 165 the New York commission
did adjust future annual allowances because of an excess accumulation
in the reserve. As stated above,160 this is probably indefensible in a
court proceeding in view of the decision in the case of Board of Public
Utility Commissioners v. New York Telephone Co.,161 in the absence
of established regulations under which the reserve was accumulated
subject to the requirement that it should be used for rate base purposes. The more recent New Yark case does, however, indicate the
recognition by the commission of the inequitable nature of the company's inconsistent claims. Moreover, it shows one method whereby
the commissions attempt to bring the amounts into accord.168
168 Certain- Persons of Elmira v. Elmira Light, Heat & Power Corp., (N. Y.
Dept. Pub. Serv., State Div., 1937) 22 P. U. R. (N. S.) 99.
10• Other cases adopting a similar procedure are: Re Central Arizona Light &
Power Co., (Ariz. Corp. Comm. 1934) 6 P. U. R. (N. S.) 49; Carey v. Corporation
Comm., 168 Okla. 487, 33 P. (2d) 788 (1934).
166 In re New York Tel. Co., (N. Y. Pub. Serv. Comm., State Div., 1936) 14
P. U. R. (N. S.) 443.
166 Supra, p. 489.
1117 271 U.S. 23, 46 S. Ct. 363 (1926).
168 1n the NEW YoRK CoMMISSION oN REvis10N OF THE PtraL1c SERVICE CoMMISSIONS LAw, M1NoR1TY REPORT 353-355 (1930) (N. Y. Leg. Doc. 75), the minority
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From the above discussion it appears that commissions definitely
recognize the need for consistency between annual and accrued depreciation. It is also apparent that in seeking to reach consistency the commissions have found it best to adopt age-life methods for determination
of the amount of depreciation, annual or accrued. In this the courts
have not fully agreed with the commissions and have taken what appears to the writer to be an unrealistic and impractical attitude towards
depreciation in rate regulation. Some courts have accepted the same
views as the majority of the commissions and the decisions of such
courts are worthy of particular study by the student of public utility
depreciation. The existing state of affairs is to be viewed in the light
of what was said earlier in this paper concerning the character of the
depreciation problem in public utility regulation as a matter essentially
for the regulatory commissions. Certainly the rules and practices of the
commissions with respect to this difficult problem of public utility
depreciation are better indications of the most desirable methods to be
used; and compared with the present body of vague and confusing
judicial decisions on these questions, they probably represent a closer
approach to the principles and procedures which will ultimately prevail.
Charles E. Hughes, now Chief Justice, while acting as referee in
Brooklyn Borough Gas Co. v. Public Service Commissior,. 169 made the
following statement:
"The amount of the depreciation reserve has not been held in a
separate fund, but has been invested in the plant and business, and
the assets in which the depreciation reserve is invested are embraced in those which have been valued for the purpose of determining the rate base. Plaintiff thus has credit for all the property
it uses in the public service, and there is simply deducted the
amount of its own estimate of the accrued depreciation in its plant,
which is the equivalent of its reserve maintained by collections
from customers. . . . In the absence of any countervailing evidence, the depreciation in the plant may fairly be taken at the
amount shown in the books. • • ." 170
Alvin C. Reis, chief counsel of the Wisconsin Public Service Commismembers of the commission discuss the insurmountable difficulties encountered by the
commicisions in attempting to prevent inequitable annual depreciation charges and
accrued depreciation deductions for rate base purposes under the existing regulatory
system as restricted by court decisions. Particular reference is made to th~ New York'
Telephone Company and attempts to regulate its depreciation practices.
169 (N. Y. S. Ct.) P. U. R. 1918F 335.
110 Ibid., at 352, 353.
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sion, in an address before the National Association of Railroad and
Utility Commissioners,171 saj.d these words may be history making
and cited the Lindheimer case, in which Chief Justice Hughes gave the
opinion of the Court, as opening the way for such a deduction. In this
same address the speaker enunciated the following arguments to support the practice of deducting the accumulations in the reserve as
accrued depreciation for rate base purposes: (I) the reserve represents
the recovered investment, ( 2) the customers have contributed ~s
amount as a substitute for the decline in value of the depreciating property, (3) the company should be estopped to deny that which it has
itself claimed as depreciation is the correct amount, ( 4) the reserve is
the "best measure" of expired service life.112
Attention is also called to the following passage from the statement
of Commissioner Joseph B. Eastman, now chairman of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, read at an earlier convention of the same body:
"One other conviction which I shall mention is that the principles are identical which govern the estimating of depreciation
for both accounting and valuation purposes. The depreciation
which property has suffered is the same depreciation for which
annual depreciation charges are intended to compensate. Otherwise there is no sense in such charges. It would be preposterous to
permit a reserve to be built up as a part of the expense of operation for the purpose of protecting against a deterioration in the
property which is never found to exist when that property is
valued.••.
"While I recognize that the depreciation reserve which has
been built up· may not correspond with the depreciation actually
existing in the property, because the annual charge may have been
either too smaJl or too large, it may ultimately be found that a
sound, workable plan, fair to all concerned, is to deduct the
amount of the depreciation reserve in ascertaining the rate base,
rather than the actual depreciation." 173
1934 PRoc. NAT. AssN. R.R. & UnL. CoMMRS. 215.
The reserve requirement, which is the amount which would be the correct
accrued depreciation on an age-life, straight-line method of calculating depreciation if
all the property was dealt with on a unit basis, may be more than the reserve accumulated on a group basis, which is the most commonly followed method because of the
fact that retirements of units before the average life of such items had expired since
its acquisition is not offset by retirement of other items which outline the average
life until after such average life has been passed by the entire group. For this reason
there may be some grounds for correction of the reserve in certain cases. For consideration of this subject, see W1sc0Ns1N PuBLIC SERVICE CoMM1ss10N, DEPRECIATION
186-196 (1933).
173 1932 PRoc. NAT. AssN. R. R. & UTIL. CoMMRS. 446 at 449, 450.
171

172
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The commissioner admitted there was no basis for such a plan in existing court decisions (1932), but said he had confidence in the willingness of the courts to change their views as experience threw new light
on the problems they encountered, citing as proof the dissenting opinion
of Justice Brandeis in the San Francisco case.114
It should be noted at this point that various persons, in discussing
public utility depreciation, speak of actual depeciation, just as Commissioner Eastman does, as though it is some absolute quantitative fact
which may be determined in any case by some method or formula which
is not made obvious. As a matter of fact, as the writer has attempted to
show in this paper, depreciation is, at least in public utility rate regulation, a matter of fairness and justice to all the parties concerned and
must be thought of in connection with the peculiar meaning of "value"
used for this purpose. As a result, depreciation of public utility properties is not an absolute fact to be found, but is rather that which, in
view of all the circumstances of the case, should be allowed for annual
depreciation purposes and deducted for rate base purposes.
It may be legally impossible, as well as inequitable, to require the
immediate application of consistent theories of annual and accrued
depreciation in determining the amounts to be deducted for accrued
depreciation where the necessity for consistency has not been insisted
upon by the commission in the past. The advance knowelge of regulatory restraints, mentioned earlier as a ground for holding the utility
investors bound to consistent depreciation practices and policies, is
missing in such case. It may well be that the annual depreciation practice of the company followed in the past, and approved by the commission either expressly or by implication, has resulted in improper charges
to operating expense when judged by the application of age-life rates
to be presently adopted. Some equitable basis for transfer to a consistent theory based on age-life calculations would have to be provided
to meet this situation. It would seem that in adopting a straight-line
method based on original cost, used both as a rate base and as a depreciation base ( which the writer believes to be the most equitable and
workable plan available), some such plan might be worked out as that
required by the Federal Communications Commission regarding the
telephone plant adjustment account. This account is to take care ·of
the amount by which ·cost to the accounting companies is greater than,
or less than, original cost to other telephone utilities from which the
accounting company may have purchased the property. Disposition of
m, Pacific Gas & Elec, Co. v. San Francisco, 265 U.S. 403, 44 S. Ct. 537 {1924).

1940]

PUBLIC UTILITY DEPRECIATION

501

the balance in this account is to be made in accordance with commission
regulations. There is no constitutional objection to this.176
In transferring to the consistent method of handling annual and
accrued depreciation suggested herein, the rate base previously approved by the commission might be divided into two parts. The first
part would be that valuation which would be proper on the straightline, age-life method of determination of accrued depreciation asapplied at the date of the change. Record of this could be brought on the
books by increasing the reserve for depreciation to accord with the
accrued depreciation so determined. Cost less the resulting reserve
would indicate this part of the rate base and straight-line annual depreciation based on original cost could be applied thereto in the future.
Consistent accrued depreciation as shown by the increased reserve and
subsequent accumulations from the annual charge would be used for
this portion of the rate base. The second part of the previously approved
rate base would be that not included in the apportionment given above,
and would be measured by the amount which had to be added to the
reserve for depreciation at the time of the change in method. This
might be considered as a temporary part of the rate base to be amortized
over a reasonable period in the future.
The fairness of requiring consistent policies as to annual and accrued
depreciation in the future is recognized even by those who advocate
the observation method of determining accrued depreciation. Professor
Riggs, referring to the Interstate Commerce Commission's adoption of
the straight-line plan and its holding that the full amount of the reserve so accumulated should be deducted for rate base purposes, says:
"No exception can be taken to this view of the commission in the
case of properties which have used this form of accounting for a
long period as the charge to operating expenses and the credit to
the reserve results in holding this amount from net earnings and
leaving it in the cash drawer of the company. It is collected from
the patrons for the purpose of filling an assumed hole in the plant,
and on valuation the company can hardly sustain the claim that
it is entitled to an undepreciated property and also to the reserve
collected to make good what the company itself has estimated as
depreciation." 178
The Missouri Supreme Court has taken about the same view as that
expressed by Professor Riggs. In State ex rel. Empire Electric Co. v.
175

American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 232, 57 S. Ct. 170

(1936).
170 Riggs, "Facts and Fallacies about 'Straight-line' Depreciation Methods,"
Ptra. UnL. FoRTN. 393 at 394 (1933).
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Public Service Comniission 177 there was before the court a statute
authorizing the commission to establish depreciation rates and to direct
the use of the funds thereby retained out of profits and also the treatment of the resulting depreciation reserve. The commission had taken
no action under this statute, and the company had built up a reserve
in excess of its needs for immediate retirement. $r,6oo,ooo of such
reserves had been transferred-$ 800,000 direct to surplus and used
for dividends, and $800,000 to "special surplus reserve." Thereafter
th~ commission ordered the company to restore _the $r,6oo,ooo to the
"depreciation reserve fund." The court held that the statute permitted only prospective action by the commission, and that in the
absence of any exercise of authority under the statute the commission
could not require the company to take any particular action relative to
the excess reserve or the fund. The court said that the depreciation
reserve belonged to the company and that it could not be forced to give
up the reserve not needed to keep the property in proper condition for
the benefit of future customers. However, the important feature of the
case is the fact that the court seemed to have no objection to the principle on which the statute rested in so far as its prospective application
by the commission was concerned. The statute itself indicates a progressive attitude on the part of the legislature. In the opinion of the
writer, other courts would take the same attitude as the Missouri court
relative to prospective application of either a statute or a regulation of
which there is advance notice to all parties concerned.
It may be possible that some form of legislation, such as that suggested by Donald Cook,178 would be a more satisfactory solution to the
depreciation base problem than attempts to rely upon commission regulations made known to the parties in advance. The form of statute
proposed by Cook might itself cover the depreciation base, but, of
course, this alone would. not requir~ consistent methods of determination of the annual and accrued depreciation. Commission action would
have the advantage of being more expeditious. In any case, it must be
recognized that the particular form of regulation to be prescribed even
under direct statutory authorization can be applied pro~pectively only.
CONCLUSIONS

The Report of the Special Committee on Depreciation of the
National Association of Railroad and Utility Commissioners, sub339 Mo. n88, 100 S. W. (2d) 509 (1936).
Cook, "A Statutory Definition of Fair Value: A Propooal," 7 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 475 (1939).
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mitted at the 1938 convention, embodies in effect the principles stated
herein by the writer. The fact that a group of persons so intimately
connected with the affairs of utility regulation have indicated their
belief in the fundamental soundness of the principles of consistency
in annual and accrued depreciation, and in the propriety of straightline methods based upon original cost as a means of achieving that
consistency, gives the writer added faith in the conclusions he has
drawn from this study.179 The conclusions are:
(I) Fairness to utility investors and to the patrons of utility companies, which is the aim in rate regulation, requires the application of
consistent principles in the determination of annual and accrued depreciation.
( 2) The requisite consistency can be attained only by the adoption
of original cost as the basis for calculation of both annual depreciation
and accrued depreciation and by the acceptance of the amount indicated by the reserve accumulated from the annual depreciation charges
as the accrued depreciation on any given date.
(3) The straight-line method of calculating annual depreciation
and accrued depreciation should be adopted as the most practical for
use. The observation method results in false measures of accrued depreciation which are inconsistent with annual depreciation, and the
method has no merit in greater accuracy than the age-life methods.
( 4) The principles laid down in conclusion ( 2) are being presently
adopted by the regulatory commissions and thus those principles are
becoming the practical basis of rate regulation, although some commissions still follow inconsistent theories propounded and supported by the
utilities and sanctioned by a considerable weight of judicial opinion.
(5) As to future annual depreciation, and accrued depreciation
accumulating from time of promulgation, there is no constitutional
obstacle to commission enforcement of regulations in line with the
principles in conclusions ( 2) and ( 3) where those regulations are made
known in advance of application.
·
( 6) In s_hifting from existing methods of depreciation accounting
to the consistent theory here suggested, the commissions should give
due regard to practices permitted by them in the past. Any such change
should be given a prospective effect only. It should not be retroactively
applied so as to force a reduction in rate bases heretofore approved by
the commissions, since any such effort at retroactive application would
probably meet judicial condemnation.
179
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